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“They Outlawed Solidarity!”* 
Richard Blum** 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the Unit-
ed States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.1 
 
CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 984 
I. LABOR RIGHTS AND THE PROHIBITION AGAINST INVOLUNTARY 
SERVITUDE…………………………………………………………….987 
II. SECONDARY STRIKES AND NLRA ANTISTRIKE INJUNCTIONS ......... 989 
A. Statutory Law ............................................................................... 989 
B. Scenarios ...................................................................................... 991 
C. Remedies ...................................................................................... 994 
III. NLRB CEASE AND DESIST ORDERS AGAINST UNIONS AND THEIR 
MEMBERS .............................................................................................. 994 
IV. ANTISTRIKE INJUNCTIONS IMPLICATE THE THIRTEENTH AND FIRST 
AMENDMENTS EVEN IF WORKERS CAN PERMANENTLY QUIT THEIR JOBS
 .............................................................................................................. 998 
A. Quitting Individually v. Quitting Collectively .............................. 998 
B. Quitting En Masse v. Striking ....................................................... 999 
C. Secondary Strikes and the Pollock Principle ............................. 1003 
D. Secondary Strikes and the First Amendment ............................. 1005 
                                                     
* Frances Fox Piven, a radical sociologist and expert on social movement politics, frequently used 
this phrase when she denounced the Taft-Hartley Act or the Labor-Management Relations Act; in 
particular, the Act’s prohibitions against secondary union activity. See generally Labor-Management 
Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 158(b)(4) (2012)); Richard Blum, They Outlawed Solidarity (2015) (unpublished capstone paper, 
M.A. in Labor Studies, Murphy Institute, City University of New York) (on file with author). 
** Richard Blum, Staff Attorney, The Legal Aid Society, Employment Law Unit; Adjunct Clinic 
Professor, CUNY School of Law; B.A. 1984, Yale University; J.D. 1989, New York University; 
M.A., Labor Studies, 2015, Joseph S. Murphy Institute for Worker Education and Labor Studies, 
CUNY School of Professional Studies. The author wishes to thank James Gray Pope for his gener-
ous mentorship and all of the participants in the 2015 Thirteenth Amendment and Labor Symposium 
at Seattle University School of Law for welcoming him among them.    
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
984 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 39:983 
E. Inducing or Encouraging Secondary Strikes, the NLRA’s Gag Rule, 
and the First Amendment ................................................................ 1007 
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 1007 
 
INTRODUCTION 
My active interest in the Thirteenth Amendment began several 
years ago when I assisted in the representation of ten Filipino nurses be-
ing prosecuted, along with their lawyer, for conspiring to endanger resi-
dents of the nursing home where the nurses had worked. My colleague 
and I, both staff attorneys in the Employment Law Unit of The Legal Aid 
Society in New York, assisted a pair of criminal defense attorneys who 
had taken on the nurses’ and the lawyer’s cases. The nurses were being 
prosecuted because they had collectively quit their jobs at the nursing 
home after being advised of their right to do so by their lawyer (all were 
off duty at the time they stopped working). Prior to quitting, the nurses 
had repeatedly and unsuccessfully complained about a variety of labor 
abuses and unconscionable working conditions at the nursing home and 
felt they had run out of options. In response to their quitting, the nursing 
home owners failed to convince the state licensing authorities that the 
nurses were guilty of misconduct and failed to obtain a civil injunction 
against the nurses. However, the owners were successful in persuading 
the Suffolk County district attorney to prosecute both the nurses and their 
lawyer for conspiracy. 
The overt acts alleged in the indictment were that the nurses had 
met with the lawyer and, on his advice, had agreed to file a discrimina-
tion complaint against the nursing home; that the lawyer had subsequent-
ly filed a discrimination complaint on their behalf with the Department 
of Justice; and that the nurses had quit their jobs. 
One of the most interesting developments in the case came well be-
fore I got involved, when the trial court denied the nurses’ motion to 
dismiss the indictment. The judge rejected the nurses’ argument that the 
District Attorney, in prosecuting them for quitting, sought to compel 
their continued employment in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. 
He also ruled that 
[w]hile a nurse may, often times, have a right to unilaterally resign 
from his or her position of employment, the actions of these defend-
ants, acting together with forethought and planning, was not a sim-
ple resignation from a nursing position. The consequences of their 
2016] “They Outlawed Solidarity!” 985 
mass resignation could have had disastrous consequences for the 
very patients with whose care they were entrusted.2 
The judge repeatedly stated that it was precisely because the nurses had 
acted en masse that there was sufficient evidence that the nurses had 
committed a crime.3 I found this decision very troubling. It struck me 
intuitively that if one person has the right to withhold her labor, then act-
ing in concert to withhold labor, whether as a quit or a strike, should be 
constitutionally and statutorily protected as well. 
In the end, we were able to obtain a writ of prohibition from a state 
appellate court enjoining the trial judge and prosecutor from proceeding 
with the prosecution on the grounds that it violated the Thirteenth 
Amendment rights of the nurses and the First Amendment rights of both 
the nurses and their lawyer.4 
More recently, I turned again to Thirteenth Amendment questions 
as a result of writing a First Amendment critique of the National Labor 
Relations Act’s (NLRA) ban on secondary labor picketing in support of 
consumer boycotts under NLRA § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).5 I came to see that most 
writers on this issue limited their critique to that ban, and chose not to 
address the ban on secondary strikes in the companion § 8(b)(4)(i)(B),6 
even though the latter ban is both more sweeping and consequential for 
unions than the former. 
Striking—that is, the withholding of labor—is the ultimate weapon 
of unions, both because it is often an effective tool against employers and 
because there exists a solidaristic tradition of honoring picketing lines. 
Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B)’s strike ban not only prohibits labor organizations 
from engaging in certain secondary strikes, it even prohibits them from 
                                                     
 2. People v. Vinluan, Indictment No. 769A-07 at 2–3 (Suffolk Co. Sept. 28, 2007). The State 
Education Department, the agency responsible for investigating and adjudicating allegations of nurse 
misconduct, had already cleared all of the defendants of wrongdoing. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See Vinluan v. Doyle, 873 N.Y.S.2d 72, 79–81 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009). See generally 
ROBERT J. STEINFELD, COERCION, CONTRACT, AND FREE LABOR IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
(2001).  I would be remiss if I did not mention the centrality of Professor Robert Steinfeld’s work in 
the papers that we filed in this case. At our request, Professor Steinfeld wrote to the governor to 
request the appointment of a special prosecutor to take over the case because of its Thirteenth 
Amendment implications. 
 5. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (2012). Secondary picketing is the picketing of a party other 
than the employer of the union members who are picketing. A union picketing a business to ask the 
public to boycott the business in order to pressure it not to use nonunion contractors is an example of 
a secondary picket. The nonunion contractors would be the primary target, and the business being 
picketed would be the secondary target. 
 6. Id. § 158(b)(4)(i)(B). Secondary striking entails striking a party other than the employer of 
the union members who call the strike. For example, a union striking a general contractor to get it to 
stop using a nonunion subcontractor would be a secondary strike. The general contractor would be 
considered a secondary target and the nonunion subcontractor would be the primary target. 
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“induc[ing]” or “encourag[ing]” such strikes.7 Clearly, in trying to clip 
labor’s wings, the 1947 and 1959 Congresses which adopted these stat-
utes wanted to make sure that unions could not deploy their most im-
portant source of power. Thus, Congress basically placed a gag order on 
unions as a sweeping prophylactic to prevent them from collaborating 
and initiating joint work stoppages that go beyond the immediate em-
ployer. In effect, this greatly inhibited the overall potency of unions in 
the United States. 
In attacking § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)’s ban on secondary labor picketing in 
support of a consumer boycott as a violation of the First Amendment, 
critics have repeatedly condemned the Supreme Court’s reliance on a 
supposed distinction between “pure speech” and “speech plus conduct,” 
such as a picket.8 The Court’s invocation of an “unlawful objectives” 
doctrine to defend banning speech contrary to public policy has also been 
repeatedly criticized.9 After all, picketing has been recognized as protect-
ed expressive activity10 and it is entirely lawful for consumers to choose 
to boycott the target of a picket.11 However, commentators have not 
sought to argue that striking is protected under the First Amendment.12 If 
striking can be deemed an unlawful objective, it is harder to argue 
against a ban on inducing or encouraging a strike, particularly by picket-
ing. While I understood that the First Amendment arguments concerning 
appeals for a public boycott did not translate simply to the strike ban, it 
seemed to me that such a fundamental ban on the most basic aspect of 
collective power and expression called out for constitutional scrutiny, in 
                                                     
 7. Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), in contrast, bans unions from actions that “threaten, coerce, or re-
strain” others from engaging in a boycott. 
 8. See, e.g., Mark D. Schneider, Peaceful Labor Picketing and the First Amendment, 82 
COLUM. L. REV. 1469, 1488–95 (1982). 
 9. See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, Labor Picketing and Commercial Speech: Free Enterprise Values 
in the Doctrine of Free Speech, 91 YALE L.J. 938, 942–44 (1982); Schneider, supra note 8, at 1476–
77; see also Catherine Fisk & Jessica Rutter, Labor Protest Under the New First Amendment, 36 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 277, 318–20 (2015) (applying a similar critique to bans on recogni-
tional picketing). 
 10. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907–08 (1982); Thornhill v. Ala-
bama, 310 U.S. 88, 101–02 (1940). 
 11. See Claiborne, 458 at 907; see also In re United Bhd. of Carpenters Local Union No. 1506 
(Eliason & Knuth), 355 N.L.R.B. 797 (2010). 
 12. Michael Harper has argued expressly that secondary picketing to induce strikes is not enti-
tled to First Amendment protection, in contrast to secondary picketing in support of consumer boy-
cotts. See Michael C. Harper, First Amendment Protection for Union Appeals to Consumers, 27 WIS. 
J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 176, 182–85 (2012). But see James Gray Pope, The Three-Systems Ladder of 
First Amendment Values: Two Rungs and a Black Hole, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 189, 243–45 
(1984) (providing a rebuttal to Harper’s arguments).  Estlund identified but did not address certain 
First Amendment issues that she thought picketing directed at employees rather than consumers 
might raise.  Estlund, supra note 9, at n.2. 
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particular, under the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition against invol-
untary servitude. 
Building primarily on James Gray Pope’s work on the Thirteenth 
Amendment and strikes,13 in particular, his discussion of the significance 
of the right to quit in evaluating a Thirteenth Amendment critique of an-
tistrike prohibitions, I am seeking to demonstrate that the Thirteenth 
Amendment, buttressed by the First Amendment, calls into question the 
NLRA’s sweeping ban on secondary strikes, as well as on union com-
munications to induce or encourage such strikes. Specifically, I scruti-
nize antistrike injunctions under the NLRA to consider how, in applica-
tion, antistrike injunctions directly or indirectly coerce workers into ser-
vitude, regardless of the ability of workers to quit their jobs rather than 
return to work. I also look critically at the distinction that has been made 
between mass quits and strikes, as well as the reality of both an employ-
er’s goals in seeking government intervention against a strike and the 
government’s role in aiding employers. In doing so, I argue that 
§ 8(b)(4)(i)(B)’s prohibition on secondary strikes is enforced in a way 
that implicates the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against involun-
tary servitude, and also the strikers’ and the picketers’ First Amendment 
rights to express and seek solidarity, respectively. 
I. LABOR RIGHTS AND THE PROHIBITION AGAINST INVOLUNTARY
 SERVITUDE 
Over one hundred years ago, in Bailey v. Alabama,14 the Supreme 
Court relied on the Thirteenth Amendment—and the federal Anti-
peonage Act implementing it—to strike down an Alabama statute aimed 
at keeping poor workers from quitting their jobs if they were unhappy 
with their working conditions.15 The case arose after Bailey was prose-
cuted because he had worked just over a month under a contract of ser-
vice when he quit and he had not repaid the advance he had received.16 
The law made it a crime in Alabama to “fraudulently induce” receipt of 
an advance payment for a contract of service without then performing the 
work or repaying the advance, and it treated the refusal to perform the 
work or repay the employer as prima facie evidence of intent to de-
fraud.17 Essentially, the statute enabled the state to prosecute workers 
who accepted an advance from an employer and then quit before their 
                                                     
 13. See generally James Gray Pope, Contract, Race, and Freedom of Labor in the Constitu-
tional Law of “Involuntary Servitude,” 119 YALE L.J. 1474 (2010) (discussing the significance of 
the right to quit through a Thirteenth Amendment critique of antistrike prohibitions). 
 14. 219 U.S. 219 (1911). 
 15. Id. at 244–45. 
 16. Id. at 228–30. 
 17. Id. at 227–28. 
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agreed upon term of service had ended.18 The Court found that the law 
violated the Thirteenth Amendment and the federal Anti-peonage Act. In 
striking down the Alabama statute, the Bailey Court declared: 
The plain intention [of the Thirteenth Amendment] was to abolish 
slavery of whatever name and form and all its badges and incidents; 
to render impossible any state of bondage; to make labor free, by 
prohibiting that control by which the personal service of one man is 
disposed of or coerced for another’s benefit, which is the essence of 
involuntary servitude.19 
The Court also declared that “[w]hile the immediate concern [of those 
who enacted the Thirteenth Amendment] was with African slavery, the 
Amendment was not limited to that. It was a charter of universal civil 
freedom for all persons, of whatever race, color, or estate, under the 
flag.”20 
Three decades later, in Pollock v. Williams,21 the Supreme Court 
struck down a similar criminal statute under the Thirteenth Amendment, 
reiterating that the aim of the Thirteenth Amendment and the federal An-
ti-peonage Act “was not merely to end slavery but to maintain a system 
of completely free and voluntary labor throughout the United States.”22 
In a critical passage, the Court declared that 
in general the defense against oppressive hours, pay, working condi-
tions, or treatment is the right to change employers. When the mas-
ter can compel and the laborer cannot escape the obligation to go 
on, there is no power below to redress and no incentive above to re-
lieve a harsh overlordship or unwholesome conditions of work. Re-
sulting depression of working conditions and living standards af-
fects not only the laborer under the system, but every other with 
whom his labor comes in competition.23 
In keeping with these principles, the Court held the statute to be invalid 
not only because of the presumption of intent, but also because a statute 
“may not make failure to labor in discharge of a debt any part of a crime. 
It may not directly or indirectly command involuntary servitude, even if 
it was voluntarily contracted for.”24 
It is important to note that in both the Bailey and Pollock cases, the 
Court not only justified its decisions as necessary to vindicate the rights 
                                                     
 18. ALA. CODE § 4730 (1896), as amended by 1903 Ala. Acts 345 & 1907 Ala. Acts 636. 
 19. Bailey, 219 U.S. at 241. 
 20. Id. at 240–41. 
 21. 322 U.S. 4 (1944). 
 22. Id. at 17. 
 23. Id. at 18. 
 24. Id. at 24. 
2016] “They Outlawed Solidarity!” 989 
of the individuals involved, but also to ensure a system of free labor, of 
“universal civil freedom for all.”25 Absent a worker’s ability to quit 
without fear of prosecution, there would be no systemic check on the 
ability of employers to coerce personal service or to impose a “harsh 
overlordship or unwholesome conditions of work.”26 A worker’s ability 
to quit is necessary to enable all workers to labor freely. 
Following Pollock, the Court issued a decision ruling that a statute 
banning intermittent unannounced strikes did not violate the Thirteenth 
Amendment, but noted that nothing in the statute at issue made it a crime 
“to abandon work individually or collectively.”27 Thus, the Court left 
open the question of what types of “abandon[ing] work individually or 
collectively” remain protected under the Thirteenth Amendment.28 
The question I hope to address in this Article is how, in light of 
these decisions and their understanding of free labor, the Thirteenth 
Amendment and the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment protect 
workers against antistrike injunctions sought by the government at the 
behest of employers or targeted businesses with the objective of compel-
ling workers to return to work. I intend to demonstrate that abandoning 
work through unprotected strikes does not differ in constitutionally rele-
vant ways from mass quitting—an activity that is unquestionably pro-
tected under these precedents. 
II. SECONDARY STRIKES AND NLRA ANTISTRIKE INJUNCTIONS 
A. Statutory Law 
Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice 
for a labor organization (generally a union) 
to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by 
any person engaged in commerce . . . to engage in, a strike or a re-
fusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, 
transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, mate-
rials, or commodities or to perform any services . . . where . . . an 
object thereof is . . . (B) forcing or requiring any person to cease us-
ing, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the 
                                                     
 25. Bailey, 219 U.S. at 241. 
 26. Pollock, 322 U.S. at 18. 
 27. UAW Local 232 v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245, 251 (1949) (WERB), over-
ruled on other grounds by Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 
427 U.S. 132 (1976) (citation omitted). 
 28. Id. (citation omitted); see Pope, supra note 13, at 1544–46 (interpreting the decision in 
WERB). 
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products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to 
cease doing business with any other person.29 
This sweeping prohibition is followed by the proviso that “nothing con-
tained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not 
otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing.”30 
In short, this provision of the NLRA makes it an unlawful labor 
practice for a union to strike an employer or refuse to do certain work for 
an employer in order to force or require that employer to cease doing 
business with another company. In other words, it is unlawful for a union 
to strike a business with which it does not have a direct dispute over 
wages or working conditions, the supposedly neutral or secondary target, 
in order to make that business cut off or put pressure on the real target of 
the union campaign. Not only may a union not engage in a secondary 
strike, it is also prohibited from inducing or encouraging “any individu-
al” from engaging in a secondary strike. 
The secondary strike is a powerful tool by which unions can put 
pressure where they have power in order to pressure their ultimate target, 
even when they lack the power to directly pressure that target. We live in 
a society with increasingly “fissured workplaces,” in which work is out-
sourced and divided up among many different actors through the use of 
subcontracting, temporary employment agencies, franchises, and conver-
sion of employees into independent contractors.31 In such a context, it is 
not surprising that workers might want to strike or boycott a vulnerable 
point in a supply chain in order to influence the conduct of another point 
in the supply chain where the workers lack power. International labor 
solidarity campaigns use this sort of strategy frequently. By targeting 
name brands in the United States with bad publicity or boycotts to influ-
ence the labor practices of their foreign suppliers whose workers have 
been unable to effect change, workers in the United States have sought to 
function as labor allies.32 However, through the prohibitions on second-
                                                     
 29. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(i)(B) (2012). For a detailed explanation of the evolution of this pro-
vision from the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act to the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 
1959 (Landrum-Griffin Act), Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519, see Richard A. Bock, Secondary 
Boycotts: Understanding NLRB Interpretation of Section 8(B)(4)(b) of the National Labor Relations 
Act, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 905, 913–16 (2005). 
 30. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(i)(B) (2012). 
 31. See DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME BAD FOR SO MANY 
AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT (2014); see also INT’L TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION, 
FRONTIERS REPORT 2016 – SCANDAL (2016), available at  http://www.ituc-csi.org/frontlines-report-
2016-scandal?lang=en. 
 32. See, e.g., INT’L LAB. RIGHTS F., http://www.laborrights.org/our-work (last visited May 14, 
2015); UNITED STUDENTS AGAINST SWEATSHOPS, http://usas.org/ (last visited May 14, 2015); 
CLEAN CLOTHES CAMPAIGN, http://www.cleanclothes.org/ranaplaza (last visited May 14, 2015). But 
see GAY W. SEIDMAN, BEYOND THE BOYCOTT: LABOR RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND 
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ary pickets and strikes, United States labor law greatly curtails such soli-
daristic action when it is undertaken by a union or group of unions repre-
senting workers of a particular employer or employers to promote use of 
union labor or union labor standards by another employer within the 
United States.33 
B. Scenarios  
Most of the case law concerning secondary strikes34 developed 
through disputes in the construction industry. Long before the “fissuring” 
of the United States workplace, construction jobs, by their very nature, 
involved workers from a variety of trades working on the same job site at 
the same time for a variety of contractors or subcontractors.35 If some 
workers on a site were union members and others were not, one union, or 
a confederation of unions, might have decided to oppose the use of   
nonunion labor at that site, even if the dispute was not with the employer 
of the union or union’s members. 
In the most typical scenario in secondary strike cases, a union or 
union confederation orders its members to picket a construction site 
where both union and nonunion labor is being used. The picket serves as 
a signal to union members—often from a variety of locals in different 
construction trades—not to work on that site until the dispute is resolved. 
Typically, the purpose of the strike is to pressure a general contractor to 
cease using a nonunion subcontractor or to require adherence to union 
                                                                                                                       
TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM (2007) (critiquing international campaigns that do not focus on support-
ing local labor campaigns). 
 33. There is an exception to the ban on secondary activities known as the “ally doctrine,” under 
which an employer other than the primary is not treated as secondary because of its close relation-
ship with the primary employer. See Bock, supra note 29, at 957–61. Recently, the NLRB has ex-
panded the standard for determining “joint employment” under the NLRA. See Browning-Ferris 
Indus. of Cal., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186 (2015). As a result, some employers considered secondary in 
the past will now be treated as primary because, if they qualify as joint employers with the primary 
target, they will no longer be seen as independent of the primary target and are therefore neutral. 
However, under any scenario, conflicts over secondary picketing and striking will remain. 
 34. I use the phrase “secondary strikes” to refer to situations in which a union calls on workers 
to withhold labor from a secondary target, in contrast to the broader phrase “secondary boycott,” 
which is sometimes used interchangeably with “secondary strike.” “Secondary boycotts” include 
instances in which a union calls on consumers not to buy products or services from a secondary 
target. As noted above, both myself and others have addressed First Amendment issues related to 
secondary picketing in support of consumer boycotts elsewhere. See supra note 9 and accompanying 
text; see also supra article title and accompanying footnote. 
 35. There is an extensive body of law, based on the NLRB’s decision in In re Sailors’ Union of 
the Pacific (Moore Dry Dock), 92 N.L.R.B. 547 (1950), on what union conduct is permitted in 
common situs situations—such as construction sites—where the primary target is performing work 
at the premises of a secondary business. 
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labor standards.36 Shortly after the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act, the 
Supreme Court ruled that in such scenarios, the general contractor is con-
sidered a secondary target and that such actions are to be treated as un-
lawful secondary strikes under the NLRA.37 
Other common fact patterns involve transportation unions (such as 
those representing truckers) that direct their members not to handle 
goods transported by nonunion drivers, often at construction sites.38 Such 
actions put pressure on warehouses, or other businesses to which the de-
liveries were made, to cease doing business with the nonunion deliverers. 
A union local might also strike distributors with which they have no di-
rect dispute in order to put pressure on a manufacturer that is in negotia-
tions with a sister local.39 
In all of these disputes, a union or confederation of unions is seek-
ing to enforce the solidaristic value that all of the labor at the work site 
be union labor or to assist another union in enforcing its position on labor 
standards.40 In general, the unions are not primarily making a demand of 
                                                     
 36. See NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951); see also 
NLRB v. Local 74, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 341 U.S. 707 (1951); Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 
Local 501 v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694 (1951). All three decisions enforcing § 8(b)(4) were issued on the 
same day, along with one other decision, NLRB v. Int’l Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665 (1951), which 
limited the application of § 8(b)(4). These decisions formed the foundation of jurisprudence on 
§ 8(b)(4) and secondary strikes. 
 37. Denver Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 341 U.S. at 689–90. 
 38. See, e.g., NLRB v. Local 294, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 273 F.2d 696 (2d Cir. 1960); NLRB 
v. Local 691, Int’l Bhd of Teamsters, 270 F.2d 696 (7th Cir. 1959); NLRB v. Local 47, Int’l Bhd. of 
Teamsters, 234 F.2d 296 (5th Cir. 1956); McMahon v. Local No. 600, Truck Drivers & Helpers, 123 
F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Mo. 1953). 
 39. See NLRB v. Wine, Liquor & Distillery Workers Union, Local 1, 178 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 
1949). 
 40. The NLRA contains what is commonly known as the “construction industry proviso,” 
found in 29 U.S.C. § 158(e), which creates an exception to a general rule making it an unfair labor 
practice for “any labor organization and any employer to enter into any contract or agreement, either 
express or implied, whereby such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from 
handling, using, selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other em-
ployer, or cease doing business with any other person.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(e). Such agreements are 
generally deemed unenforceable and void. Id. The construction industry proviso states that this gen-
eral rule does not apply to “an agreement between a labor organization and an employer in the con-
struction industry relating to the contracting or subcontracting of work to be done at the site of the 
construction, alteration, painting, or repair of a building, structure, or other work.” Id. However, as 
the Supreme Court has ruled, this proviso does not create an exception to the prohibitions of 
§ 8(b)(4), so that a union cannot enforce such a valid rule against nonunion labor at a construction 
work site through secondary pickets and strikes, for example against the general contractor for using 
nonunion subcontractors. See Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93 (1958) 
(holding that “hot cargo” contractual provisions that workers on construction project are not required 
to handle nonunion material not a defense to an unfair labor practice charge against a union under § 
8(b)(4)). In contrast, the “garment industry proviso,” in the same section, exempts garment industry 
unions from some of the restrictions of § 8(b)(4), specifically in actions against “a jobber, manufac-
turer, contractor, or subcontractor working on the goods or premises of the of the jobber or manufac-
turer or performing parts of an integrated process of production in the apparel and clothing industry.” 
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their employers concerning the wages or the other terms or conditions of 
employment of their members. Rather, the courts look at whether the 
employer can actually satisfy the union’s demand in determining whether 
an action is primary or secondary; that is, if it was really directed at a 
neutral target.41 
In sum, in cases enjoining secondary strikes, the union is accused of 
having its members withhold labor or inducing or encouraging other un-
ions’ members to withhold labor in order to pressure employers not to do 
business with the primary target. From a business perspective, all of 
these cases involve efforts to confine a labor dispute to the immediate 
combatants.42 In contrast, from a labor perspective, these cases limit the 
ability of unions to act in solidarity to prevent the use of nonunion labor 
or the undermining of labor standards, even when the unions that are 
striking do not stand to gain directly by the action.43 
                                                                                                                       
29 U.S.C. § 158(e). In short, the NLRA uniquely recognizes the fissured nature of the garment pro-
duction process, though it nods at that aspect of the construction industry. 
 41. The Supreme Court has described the line between primary and secondary activity as 
“more nice than obvious.” Local 761, Int’l Union of Elec., Radio & Machine Workers v. NLRB, 366 
U.S. 667, 674 (1961). Even where unions argue that they are merely enforcing contractual work 
preservation agreements, see Nat’l Woodwork Mfrs. Ass’n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 629–31 (1967), 
the Board and the courts have found refusals to handle nonunion products to be unlawful secondary 
activity where the object of the action is to pressure a secondary target and not to enforce the con-
tract itself, because the primary target does not have the power to satisfy the union’s demand. See, 
e.g., NLRB v. Enter. Ass’n of Steam, Hot Water, Hydraulic Sprinkler, Pneumatic Tube, Ice Machine 
& Gen. Pipefitters of N.Y., Local Union No. 638, 429 U.S. 507, 515 (1977) (union-instigated refusal 
to handle certain materials was unlawful secondary activity, notwithstanding contractual work 
preservation agreement, where union’s objective was in reality to influence the general contractor by 
exerting pressure on subcontractor, an employer with no power to award work to union); see also 
Douds v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, Indep., 224 F.2d 455, 459 (2d Cir. 1955) (distinguishing 
secondary activity from the Supreme Court’s 1951 trilogy of secondary strike cases by noting that in 
those cases, striking employees were neither supporting primary action nor did they have dispute 
with own employer as to conditions of work by finding, “On the contrary, their only ‘object’ was to 
promote the general solidarity of unionism by refusing to work with non-union men, even though 
these were in a different craft from theirs.”) (emphasis added). 
 42. The courts understand the prohibition not only as serving the interests of supposedly neu-
tral businesses, but the public interest as well. See, e.g., NLRB v. Local 11, United Bhd. of Carpen-
ters, 242 F.2d 932, 936 (6th Cir. 1957) (holding that Congress’ primary purpose in enacting prohibi-
tion against secondary strikes was “to protect the public interest from strikes or concerted refusals 
interrupting the flow of commerce at points removed from primary labor-management disputes. To 
allow the acquiescence of a single employer to validate conduct contrary to the express language of 
the statue would be to frustrate this Congressional purpose.”); Alpert v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 
143 F. Supp. 371, 375 (D. Mass. 1956) (protection of Board order against secondary strike is intend-
ed for more than the employer who is primary target because the public at large “is interested in not 
having strikes extend far afield”). Therefore, as noted above, even where the secondary target has 
contractually agreed not to use nonunion labor under the construction industry proviso, 29 U.S.C. § 
158(e), a union cannot enforce that commitment through picketing and strikes. Local 1976, 357 U.S. 
at 104–06. 
 43. The Supreme Court has even approved an injunction against a secondary boycott that was 
motivated entirely by a union’s political position. See Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, v. Allied Int’l, 
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C. Remedies  
There are two types of remedies for violations of § 8(b)(4)(i)(B): 
(1) the primary or secondary employer may file an unfair labor practice 
charge with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and ask the 
NLRB to seek immediate temporary injunctive relief under § 10(l);44 and 
(2) the aggrieved party may sue for damages under § 303 without involv-
ing the Board.45 If the employer files an unfair labor practice charge, the 
statute requires that the “preliminary investigation of such charge shall 
be made forthwith and given priority over all other cases.”46 Moreover, if 
the regional Board office determines after investigation that it has “rea-
sonable cause” to believe the charge is true and that a complaint should 
issue, it “shall” petition a federal district court for injunctive relief pend-
ing the Board’s final adjudication of the matter.47 If the Board ultimately 
finds that the union committed an unfair labor practice, it may, among 
other things, issue a cease and desist order and seek enforcement in a 
circuit court of appeals, which the union can appeal.48 Of course, if the 
union violates a court order, it is subject to civil and criminal contempt 
penalties. 
III. NLRB CEASE AND DESIST ORDERS AGAINST UNIONS AND THEIR 
MEMBERS 
Since the NLRA’s secondary strike prohibition runs against unions, 
it is to be expected that the Board’s cease and desist orders also run 
against unions and their representatives. This enforcement approach rais-
es the question of whether these orders implicate the rights of members. 
                                                                                                                       
Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 226 (1982) (upholding injunction where the union opposed the Soviet Union’s 
invasion of Afghanistan). For a Thirteenth Amendment critique of that decision, see Seth Kupfer-
berg, Political Strikes, Labor Law, and Democratic Rights, 71 VA. L. REV. 685, 734 (1985). 
 44. 29 U.S.C. § 160(l) (2012). The provisions allowing for injunctive relief against secondary 
strikes and other secondary activities by unions created an exception to the removal of federal court 
jurisdiction to issue labor injunctions in the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101–15 
(1998). In United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941), the Court struck down an antitrust in-
dictment for instituting primary and secondary strikes, applying both the labor exemptions in the 
antitrust laws and the Norris-LaGuardia Act. In advancing what became the Taft-Hartley Act, Sena-
tor Taft noted that the provisions concerning secondary boycotts reversed the effect of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act. See NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 686 (1951) 
(citation omitted). 
 45. 29 U.S.C. § 187. A § 303 action can be brought by “whoever shall be injured in his busi-
ness or property” by a union’s violation of § 8(b)(4). Id. § 187(b). Recovery is limited to damages 
sustained by the party suing and costs of the suit. Id. The issue of possible constitutional limitations 
on remedies available under this section is beyond the scope of this Article.  
 46. Id. § 160(l). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. § 160(e). 
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Some cases have interpreted Pollock or Wisconsin Employment Re-
lations Board to mean that any order that does not prohibit workers from 
quitting—either individually or collectively—does not run afoul of the 
Thirteenth Amendment.49 As we shall see, this interpretation does not 
bear out under scrutiny. 
NLRB v. Wine, Liquor & Distillery Workers Union, (Local 1),50 
presents a classic secondary strike and antistrike injunction under the 
first version of the § 8(b)(4) prohibition against secondary strikes. The 
unions at issue in these cases were engaging in work stoppages at the 
warehouses of independent liquor distributors in order to pressure 
Schenley, the producer of the whiskey, who was being struck by a sister 
local. The Board found a violation of the then-new secondary strike pro-
hibition and issued a cease and desist order requiring the unions and their 
agents to 
[c]ease and desist from engaging in, or inducing the members of 
Local 1 to engage in, a strike or concerted refusal in the course of 
their employment to perform services for any employer, where an 
object thereof is to require any employer or other person to cease 
doing business with Schenley Distillers Corporation.51 
The Second Circuit upheld the injunction and dismissed Thirteenth 
Amendment arguments against it by citing to the WERB decision without 
further comment.52 
This type of cease and desist order is typical of Board orders in 
secondary strike cases. Following the prohibition in the statute, the order 
runs only against the union and its agents, not the members. It orders the 
union not to engage in, or induce its members to engage in, strikes 
against secondary targets, but does not appear to coerce any given work-
er to provide labor against her will. Indeed, the point of the Second Cir-
cuit’s cite to WERB is presumably to show that the order not to strike 
                                                     
 49. See, e.g., NLRB v. Nat’l Mar. Union of Am., 175 F.2d 686, 692 (2d Cir. 1949) (“We think 
that, under Supreme Court decisions, the ‘involuntary servitude’ provision of the Thirteenth 
Amendment is inapplicable here. For the Board’s order does not expressly forbid employees to leave 
their jobs, individually or in concert. It is directed only against the Union and its agents.”) (citing 
Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17–18 (1944)). 
 50. 178 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1949). 
 51. In re Wine, Liquor & Distillery Workers Union, Local 1, 78 N.L.R.B. 504, 508 (1948). 
 52. NLRB v. Wine, Liquor & Distillery Workers Union, Local 1, 178 F.2d 584, 587 (2d Cir. 
1949). The Second Circuit also dismissed First Amendment arguments, citing Giboney v. Empire 
Storage Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949), for the proposition that otherwise unlawful conduct is not 
protected because it is executed using speech. For a critique of Giboney’s application with respect to 
labor picketing, see Estlund, supra note 9, at 943, and Schneider, supra note 9, at 1476–80. I will 
return at the end to the question of whether inducing or encouraging a secondary strike by picketing 
is protected activity under the First Amendment if the strike itself is constitutionally protected and 
not properly unlawful. 
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does not offend the Thirteenth Amendment because the workers are still 
free to “abandon” their work individually or collectively. But that read-
ing of WERB itself is as highly problematic as the blithe assumption that 
the order does not coerce the workers. 
First, it is not clear that the WERB decision supports the Local 1 
court’s implicit interpretation of it. The WERB Court found intermittent 
and unannounced strikes to be unprotected, but did not address full-on 
strikes. That distinction has become critical to the question of whether 
primary strikes are protected or not, and should not be treated as trivial in 
this context.53 It should require more than an assumption to establish that 
the WERB holding applies to a full-on strike in which workers “abandon” 
their work for the duration of the strike.54 
Second, it is simply inaccurate, for a variety of reasons, for courts 
to assert that injunctions against unions do not implicate the rights of 
their members. First, members have deep associational interests in the 
union and its activities, particularly strikes in which they participate.55 
Ordering workers’ representatives to rescind decisions made and actions 
taken on their behalf implicates their own freedom to act. In addition, 
members have a direct financial stake in whether their unions are fined 
because unions are funded by their dues. 
Finally, and most importantly, § 10(l) injunctions do sometimes di-
rectly enjoin members not to strike. District courts in Florida and New 
Jersey56 have issued § 10(l) injunctions against the longshoremen and the 
                                                     
 53. See, e.g., Henricks Realty, 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1308, 1309 (Advice Memorandum, May 
31, 1985) (“[T]he Board has consistently held that a work stoppage that is intermittent or recurrent 
constitutes an unprotected partial strike.”); see also Craig Becker, Better than a Strike: Protecting 
New Forms of Collective Work Stoppages Under the National Labor Relations Act, 61 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 351, 354 (1994). 
 54. My own view is that the Thirteenth Amendment (and the NLRA) should be read to protect 
intermittent strikes, but I do not believe that the Court’s position to the contrary in WERB necessi-
tates a holding that no collective work stoppages short of mass quits have constitutional protection. 
By its own terms, WERB stands at most for the proposition that even after Pollock, the right to 
“abandon work” is not absolute, leaving the question of its precise contours for another day. See 
Pope, supra note 13, at 1545 (interpreting WERB’s use of “abandon work” as more ambiguous and 
possibly broader than just quitting, whether individually or collectively). 
 55. Even while taking the position that an injunction against the union and not workers them-
selves did not implicate “involuntary servitude,” the court in Dayton Co. v. Carpet, Linoleum & 
Resilient Floor Decorators’ Union, Local No. 596, 39 N.W.2d 183, 197 (Minn. 1949), appeal dis-
missed, 339 U.S. 906 (1950), recognized that “consideration of the question of involuntary servitude 
can relate only to those defendants who might be affected by having to work alongside nonunion 
men if they choose to remain in the employ of plaintiff.” The court thereby acknowledged the asso-
ciational interests of workers with respect to their union.   
 56. Dowd v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 781 F. Supp. 1565, 1566–67 (M.D. Fla. 1991); Pas-
carell v. Local 560, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, No. 90-3993, 1990 WL 168861 (D. N.J. Oct. 29, 1990). 
These cases involved § 8(b)(4) injunctions due to jurisdictional disputes, but the subject matter of the 
dispute is irrelevant to the court’s use of injunctions directly against union members, as well as their 
unions. 
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teamsters that included language prohibiting members from engaging in 
strikes, as well as inducing or encouraging them. 
Moreover, even if the cease and desist order facially runs only 
against the union, the union must comply with it by rescinding picketing 
or strike orders to its workers. It must also act as an enforcer for the 
Board and the court, making sure that workers do not engage in a strike 
if it wishes to avoid a contempt finding and the corollary penalties.57 Es-
sentially, the Board and the courts kick the worker coercion ball down 
the road when they order the union not to engage in, induce, or encour-
age a strike. This enforcement role is not simply theoretical. If a strike 
continues, with or without union compliance with an order to rescind the 
strike order and picketing, the union could find itself in contempt pro-
ceedings facing harsh penalties. Furthermore, a contempt order could be 
issued against individual members for engaging in a strike. 
In Roth v. United Union of Roofers, Waterproofers & Allied Work-
ers,58 for example, the court’s contempt order provided that the union, 
its officers, agents, representatives, servants, employees, attorneys 
and all members and persons acting in concert or participating with 
it, be and hereby are enjoined and restrained from in any manner 
picketing, causing to picket, threatening to cause a work stoppage, 
causing a work stoppage, or otherwise inducing or encouraging any 
individual employed by any person engaged in commerce or in in-
dustry affecting commerce, to refuse to handle or work on goods or 
perform services where an object of such activity is to remove or 
exclude [the employer at issue] from the construction site.59 
In short, while the Board and courts may couch their initial orders as not 
implicating the right of workers to abandon their work, it is clear that the 
courts’ enforcement powers also implicate workers’ rights directly. In 
effect, the cease and desist order against a union during a secondary 
strike presents union members with the option of returning to work or 
quitting their jobs permanently.  
                                                     
 57. The Supreme Court has articulated a very broad standard for determining when a union has 
induced or encouraged a strike, even outside of the context of contempt proceedings. “The words 
‘induce or encourage’ are broad enough to include in them every form of influence and persua-
sion.” Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 701–02 (1951); see also NLRB v. Local 
3, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 477 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1973) (citing United States v. United Mine 
Workers, 77 F. Supp. 563, 566 (D.D.C. 1948) (“If a nod or a wink or a code was used in place of the 
word ‘strike,’ there was just as much a strike called as if the word ‘strike’ had been used.”)). 
 58. Roth v. United Union of Roofers, Waterproofers, & Allied Workers, Local No. 11, No. 94 
C 7308, 1995 WL 12259 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 1995). This case was brought under § 8(b)(7) of the 
NLRA, but the subject matter is irrelevant to the point about the relief available. 
 59. Id. at *9 (emphasis added). 
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The Fifth Circuit was explicit about this coercive choice under public 
sector federal labor law in United States v. Martinez.60 In affirming crim-
inal contempt rulings against officers of the PATCO union for failing to 
report to work in violation of an injunction against the union, the court 
stated: 
As appellants emphasize, the district court’s restraining orders did 
not, indeed could not, order these individuals to return to their jobs. 
The court could and did order them, however, to choose between re-
turning to work and quitting their employment. We have observed 
before that this “work or quit” option is a permissible means of en-
joining illegal strikes without offending the Thirteenth Amend-
ment’s protection against involuntary servitude.61 
Thus, when evaluating the Thirteenth Amendment implications of 
antistrike injunctions against unions under the NLRA, we must look be-
yond their face to the implicit injunctions against workers striking. 
IV. ANTISTRIKE INJUNCTIONS IMPLICATE THE THIRTEENTH AND FIRST 
AMENDMENTS EVEN IF WORKERS CAN PERMANENTLY QUIT THEIR JOBS 
That NLRB antistrike injunctions under §§ 8(b)(4) and 10(l) coerce 
workers not to strike still leaves the fundamental question whether state 
coercion of workers not to strike violates the Thirteenth Amendment or 
at least invites strict scrutiny under the Thirteenth Amendment. The key 
challenge in the case law is whether availability of the right to quit a job 
and change employers is sufficient to provide the “power below” and the 
“incentive above” to prevent a “harsh overlordship” or “unwholesome 
conditions.”62 To answer that question, it is worth determining whether 
there is a principled basis to distinguish constitutionally between aban-
doning work by quitting or by striking. 
A. Quitting Individually v. Quitting Collectively  
The WERB decision strongly implies that the Thirteenth Amend-
ment protects the right to quit both individually and collectively. In re-
jecting a Thirteenth Amendment attack on the rule at issue in that case, 
the Court, citing Pollock, distinguished between the types of actions pro-
hibited by that rule on the one hand, and abandoning work individually 
                                                     
 60. See United States v. Martinez, 686 F.2d 334, 345 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 61. Id. (emphasis added) (citing New Orleans Steamship Ass’n v. Gen. Longshore Workers, 
626 F.2d 455, 463 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing WERB). The defendants in the PATCO case were officers 
of the union, but the action for which they were cited for contempt was failing to report to work. See 
id. at 337–38. 
 62. See Pope, supra note 13. For cases overturning strike bans or antistrike injunctions on 
Thirteenth Amendment grounds, see id. at 1546 n.285.   
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or collectively on the other. Thus, the Court implies that banning workers 
from abandoning work either individually or collectively would raise 
Thirteenth Amendment objections. The Vinluan court also implicitly 
adopted that view by not following the trial judge’s reasoning that the 
nurses’ resignations lost Thirteenth Amendment protection because they 
were undertaken collectively.63 
The policy statements in both the Norris–LaGuardia Act64 and the 
NLRA65 reveal that Congress did not believe that individuals’ ability to 
express their voice through the market mechanism of exit was sufficient 
to prevent a “harsh overlordship” or “unwholesome conditions.”66 These 
laws involve state interventions in the labor market to grant workers pro-
cedural protections to enable them to gain necessary bargaining power 
through concerted action. Notwithstanding several court decisions to the 
contrary,67 the ability of individuals to quit their jobs and change em-
ployers is insufficient to satisfy the Thirteenth Amendment’s mandate to 
“maintain a system of completely free and voluntary labor throughout the 
United States.”68 At a minimum, the ability to quit collectively must be 
available. 
B. Quitting En Masse v. Striking  
Case law has also distinguished quitting permanently from quitting 
temporarily to apply specific targeted pressure to the employer. In sever-
al cases, the courts have declared that the Thirteenth Amendment does 
not protect collective withholding of labor on a temporary basis.69 It is 
                                                     
 63. See In re Vinluan v. Doyle, 60 A.D.3d 237, 245–47 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009). 
 64. 29 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (“Whereas under prevailing economic conditions, developed with 
the aid of governmental authority for owners of property to organize in the corporate and other forms 
of ownership association, the individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual 
liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and 
conditions of employment, wherefore, though he should be free to decline to associate with his fel-
lows, it is necessary that he have full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of 
representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment, and 
that he shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their 
agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activi-
ties for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; therefore, the follow-
ing definitions of and limitations upon the jurisdiction and authority of the courts of the United 
States are enacted.”). 
 65. Id. § 151 (referring to “[t]he inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not 
possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in 
the corporate or other forms of ownership association”). 
 66. See Pope, supra note 13, at 1552. 
 67. Id. at 1546 n.286 and accompanying text. 
 68. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17 (1944). 
 69. See, e.g., France Packing Co. v. Dailey, 166 F.2d 751, 753 (3d Cir. 1948) (“The contention 
that a limitation of the right to strike under the specified narrow conditions of Section 8 partakes of 
involuntary servitude is not substantiated by the cases. To the contrary, there is a wide distinction 
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not obvious why the distinction between being able to quit permanently 
and being able to withhold labor temporarily is relevant to a Thirteenth 
Amendment analysis.70 Given the history of the Amendment71 and the 
language of the text, it is not at all a foregone conclusion that the 
Amendment does not protect at least some strike activity. 
Before examining why the Thirteenth Amendment may protect at 
least some strikes, it is important to look critically at the Supreme 
Court’s analysis of the distinction between quitting and striking in Textile 
Workers Union of America v. Darlington.72 In Darlington, the Court held 
that an employer has an absolute right under the NLRA to close a busi-
ness entirely for any reason, including anti-union motives, but that the 
same unfettered right does not apply to closing part of the business.73 In 
reaching this conclusion, the Court analogized the difference between a 
total closing and a partial closing to that between a quit en masse and a 
strike. The Court stated: 
One of the purposes of the Labor Relations Act is to prohibit the 
discriminatory use of economic weapons in an effort to obtain fu-
ture benefits. . . . Although employees may be prohibited from en-
gaging in a strike under certain conditions, no one would consider it 
                                                                                                                       
between a worker quitting his job, for any reason or no reason, on the one hand, and a cessation of 
production by workers who seek to win a point from management, on the other hand.”); Pope, supra 
note 13, at 1546 n.287 and accompanying text; see also Dayton Co. v. Carpet, Linoleum & Resilient 
Floor Decorators’ Union, Local No. 596, 39 N.W.2d 183, 198 (Minn. 1949) (“The principal distinc-
tion between the conception of a strike and the right of an individual to work for whom he chooses is 
that in a strike the employe [sic] does not sever his relationship with his employer, but merely sus-
pends his services for the purpose of putting pressure upon the employer, hoping thereby to induce 
him to accede to the demands of the employe [sic].”). 
 70. See Kupferberg, supra note 43, at 734 (critiquing the distinction, for Thirteenth Amend-
ment purposes, between a strike and a group quit). The distinction between striking and quitting 
takes on significance under labor statutes in ways that are not relevant to this discussion. See, e.g., 
NLRB v. KSM Indus., Inc., 682 F.3d 537, 545–46 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding that striking employees, 
who resigned because they needed to access their 401(k) accounts during unfair labor practice strike, 
did not intend to permanently abandon their employment and were therefore entitled to remedial 
backpay); Limbach Co. v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n, 949 F.2d 1211, 1217–18 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(“[S]econdary boycott provisions prohibit a union from inducing employees to refuse to perform 
services during the course of employment but do not preclude inducements to quit, as quitting is not 
a refusal to perform services during the course of employment.”); Bd. of Trustees, Packinghouse 
Workers & Meat Cutters, Local 630 v. Crown Packing Co., No. 5-72432, 1978 WL 1751, at *2 
(E.D. Mich. June 19, 1978) (approving differentiation in treatment of pension benefit contributions 
for employees who quit and those who strike). Whether or not labor law prohibits unions from in-
ducing workers to quit, for example, does not determine whether or not the law can constitutionally 
preclude them from inducing workers to strike or to engage in a strike. See Crown Packing Co., 
1978 WL 1751, at *1-2. 
 71. Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 
437, 437 (1989) (discussing that the congressional debates on the Thirteenth Amendment addressed 
what constitutes fair and just labor relations). 
 72. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965). 
 73. Id. at 275. 
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a violation of the Act for the same employees to quit their employ-
ment en masse, even if motivated by a desire to ruin the employer. 
The very permanence of such action would negate any future eco-
nomic benefit to the employees. The employer’s right to go out of 
business is no different.74 
This analogy between workers and businesses does not hold for a variety 
of reasons,75 including that the Thirteenth Amendment right to quit is not 
equally applicable to employers and employees. Unlike the First 
Amendment, the Thirteenth Amendment is not neutral as to parties, but 
rather protects workers and limits the power of bosses. 
The Darlington Court was not wrong to observe that there is a dif-
ference between severing a relationship permanently and not doing so. 
However, the most significant aspect of the Darlington Court’s reason-
ing, when comparing quitting and striking under the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, lies in the recognition that quitting has a significant impact on an 
employer even though the separation is ostensibly permanent. The Dar-
lington Court ‘s opinion suggests that employees quitting en masse could 
ruin an employer, but fails to recognize the significance of this observa-
tion. 
It is precisely because of that potential impact of quitting that the 
Pollock Court found constitutional significance in the ability to quit. In 
the view of the Pollock Court, voting by exit gives an incentive above to 
prevent a “harsh overlordship” and “unwholesome conditions.”76 Thus, 
the right to quit en masse lies not only in the importance of separation 
itself. Perhaps paradoxically, it lies also in the impact of separation on 
ongoing relationships between remaining workers and bosses and, as a 
result, the effect of the right to exit on creating or protecting a system of 
free labor.77 In other words, protecting exit is critical to ensuring the bar-
gaining position of any remaining or future workers at that particular 
work site and in the labor system as a whole. In addition, the freedom 
and capacity to abandon work, whether by quitting en masse or by strik-
                                                     
 74. Id. at 272. 
 75. At its most basic, it treats business assets and human labor as equivalent, which is morally, 
politically, and legally problematic. See 15 U.S.C. § 17 (“The labor of a human being is not a com-
modity or article of commerce.”). Of course, a business closing has an ongoing impact on workers, 
particularly in a community that depended heavily on the business. I therefore believe that Darling-
ton was incorrectly decided. But the issue I am concerned with is whether the Darlington Court 
identified a constitutionally significant distinction between permanently quitting, even en masse, and 
striking. I do not believe that it did. 
 76. See supra text accompanying note 23. 
 77. See Pope, supra note 13, at 1517. 
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ing, is at least as significant in providing a check on employers’ power as 
the actual act of abandoning work.78 
Secondary strikes, which, by definition, do not seek direct im-
provements in wages and working conditions from the secondary tar-
get,79 highlight the constitutional resemblance between striking and quit-
ting en masse as forms of “abandoning work.” In both cases, abandoning 
work gives workers the “power below” to redress violations of accepted 
labor norms on behalf of other workers, and creates the incentive above 
to comply with those norms.80 
This critique of the supposed distinction between mass quitting and 
striking points to Pope’s “functional approach” to the Thirteenth 
Amendment, or what I would call a systemic approach.81 This approach 
looks to determine the rights necessary to create a system of free labor. 
“The workers’ power and the employers’ incentive are generated not at 
the individual level, between a particular laborer and employer, but in the 
aggregate, through the workings of the free labor system.”82 After all, 
unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, the Thirteenth Amendment is not 
written in terms of the rights of individuals (e.g., to equal protection of 
the laws or due process of law) but rather declares that the institutions of 
slavery and involuntary servitude “shall not exist.”83  For this reason, 
involuntary servitude cannot play a role in our system of labor relations. 
As Pope argues, the question is whether protecting strikes is neces-
sary to providing the “power below” and the “incentive above” to pre-
vent a “harsh overlordship” and “unwholesome conditions,”84 and there-
by to maintaining “a system of completely free and voluntary labor 
throughout the United States.”85 With that in mind, let us examine what 
is really going on when an employer applies for injunctive relief from the 
Board and, through it, the courts. 
                                                     
 78. As both Pope and Steinfeld observe, for the freedom to quit to relieve a worker of involun-
tary servitude, the worker has to have viable options. See Pope, supra note 13, at 1527; STEINFELD, 
supra note 4, at 284. 
 79. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 80. In theory, for the specific workers involved, striking against a primary target, at least, 
should be better suited than mass quitting to securing better working conditions with the employer 
being struck, because they hope to have an ongoing relationship with that employer. But that fact 
militates toward the need for greater constitutional protection of the strike (the temporary abandon-
ment of work, as a weapon against conditions of servitude), and not, as the Darlington Court’s rea-
soning seems to imply, a justification to limit it. 
 81. Pope, supra note 13, at 1517. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17 (1944) (holding that we must “maintain a system of 
completely free and voluntary labor throughout the United States”). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
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C. Secondary Strikes and the Pollock Principle  
When an employer faces an unprotected secondary strike, it has the 
legal option of firing the striking workers. If the employer or the business 
that is the ultimate target of the secondary strike turns to the govern-
ment—specifically, the NLRB and, through it, the courts—for injunctive 
relief, it does so in order to coerce the workers to return to work. The 
argument that the workers have the right to quit, either individually or 
collectively, misses the goal of the complaining employer and the gov-
ernment to force the strikers back to work. This goal has been justified 
by the need to maintain production of goods or services by relieving the 
pressure on both the “neutral” and the ultimate target.  This is precisely 
the public interest that the courts cite in justifying injunctions even where 
the secondary target has acquiesced to the strikers’ demands.86  Thus, as 
demonstrated, the antistrike order has the power to coerce workers back 
to work. Judging from the dearth of examples of recent secondary strike 
court cases, it would seem that the employer and government’s power to 
wield such injunctions has proved highly successful. 
Antistrike injunctions are both coercive—in ways that implicate the 
Thirteenth Amendment—and suppressive of expression—in ways that 
implicate the First Amendment.  With unprotected strikes, the striking 
employee’s only legal connection to the place of employment lies in the 
possibility that the employer will, in the end, choose unequivocally to 
condone the strike and grant the workers the right to return with whatev-
er stake they had in the company (e.g., seniority, credit toward vesting of 
a pension) intact.87  In other words, the workers potentially do have 
something to lose if they quit instead of striking. However, what the 
workers have during the strike is highly dependent on their employers in 
the end, since they have no legal claim to anything from the employer 
that has not already vested. Whether quitting or striking, the employer 
can always seek to take them back to settle the dispute or after the dis-
pute is settled. Either way, the workers are abandoning work en masse 
without any legal guarantee of the right to return to work. 
This legal situation leaves secondary strikers subject to coercion by 
the government because, as a practical matter, they may still have some-
thing to lose by quitting.  This is particularly so if the “neutral” employer 
otherwise wishes to maintain a productive ongoing relationship with the 
union or unions in question, as is often the case in the construction indus-
                                                     
 86. See supra note 42. 
 87. See Exum v. NLRB, 546 F.3d 719, 727 (6th Cir. 2008) (upholding a Board finding that the 
employer did not condone the strike). 
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try.88 But, as discussed more below, it also means that from a legal point 
of view, the difference between their striking instead of quitting is large-
ly expressive. In striking, workers express a desire to have an ongoing 
future relationship once the dispute is resolved. By quitting, they re-
nounce a future relationship with that employer. Thus, to the extent a 
Board or court order against striking relies on the workers’ stake in the 
possibility of regaining their status due to the employer condoning the 
strike, the order is highly coercive.  This coercion undermines the “pow-
er below” and “incentive above” that the workers have to pressure their 
bosses, whether on their own behalf or on behalf of other workers. 
This level of coercion affects more than the particular workers in 
any given dispute.  Taking a “functional” or systemic approach to the 
issue, all union members are vulnerable to being coerced back to work 
by the government, whether implicitly or explicitly, which undermines 
the system of free labor. It is one thing for an individual employer, with 
the possible exception of a giant like Wal-Mart, to fire or otherwise pun-
ish workers for engaging in an unprotected strike. It is quite another for 
the state, through its legislative and enforcement powers, to stop or pre-
vent such labor strikes systemically. 
Although the Thirteenth Amendment applies equally to private and 
government conduct, neither can participate in nor facilitate slavery or 
involuntary servitude. The impact of a generally applicable, enforceable, 
and enforced government rule on the bargaining power of workers is far 
greater than the decisions of any given employer. For that reason, the 
availability and use of antistrike injunctions in the NLRA deals a serious 
blow to the power of workers to prevent conditions of servitude. Fur-
thermore, because the results of the government’s actions are system-
wide, its antistrike legislation makes any resulting servitude anything but 
voluntary.89 As Pope argues, without viable options, servitude becomes 
involuntary.90 
                                                     
 88. As discussed below, the line between quitting and striking in the construction industry is 
particularly blurry, since the employment relationship involved is inherently temporary in any event. 
 89. It is worth noting that Taft-Hartley bans on secondary activity cannot properly be seen as a 
congressional interpretation of the limits of any Thirteenth Amendment right to strike. As Pope has 
detailed, the NLRA was enacted pursuant to Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce, not 
under the Thirteenth Amendment. See James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the 
Commerce Clause: Labor and the Shaping of American Constitutional Law, 1921–1957, 102 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 (2002). Therefore, the NLRA is not owed any deference under the Thirteenth 
Amendment. 
 90. See Pope, supra note 13, at 1527; STEINFELD, supra note 4, at 284. 
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D. Secondary Strikes and the First Amendment  
Returning to the dynamics of the scenario in which workers are en-
gaging in or threatening to engage in an unprotected strike, the unpro-
tected nature of the strike points to First Amendment problems with an-
tistrike injunctions. To the extent that the workers have no legal claim on 
their jobs unless or until the employer condones the strike, the difference 
between a mass quitting and a strike is fundamentally expressive. The 
workers are taking a solidaristic stand rather than walking away perma-
nently. The difference between declaring themselves strikers rather than 
quitting, if any at all, is purely in the expression of that claim and not in 
any enforceable right. By deploying antistrike injunctions, rather than 
letting employers sort out the situation on their own, the government is 
suppressing expressive activity, precisely because of its viewpoint. This 
raises significant First Amendment problems. 
This argument has even greater force in construction cases. Con-
struction workers generally have no lasting relationship with a specific 
employer. Their relationship is with the union and the type of work. 
Their pensions, benefits, and seniority are not bound to a particular job. 
For this reason, the difference between mass quitting and striking cannot 
be characterized easily as a material one. Construction workers’ second-
ary strikes are temporary in that the workers return when their demands 
are satisfied or they are replaced. But legally, they have no more stake in 
the job they have left than someone who has left it permanently. They 
have only the possibility of returning if the dispute is settled. Someone 
who “quit” to honor a picket line might also return once the dispute is 
over. In this context, the difference between quitting, striking, and, in 
particular, honoring a picket line, is merely one of expression. 
Commentators on the fallacy of the speech-conduct distinction in 
pure § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) secondary picketing cases have not explored wheth-
er their critique is just as available in the context of secondary strikes 
under § 8(b)(4)(i)(B). One concern of critics may be that striking, unlike 
peaceful picketing, goes beyond expressive activity to an act of direct 
economic coercion. However, as the Darlington Court pointed out, quit-
ting en masse can ruin an employer. It is economically coercive, and yet 
it is also constitutionally protected under the Thirteenth Amendment. 
Therefore, the fact that striking is coercive cannot be decisive in deter-
mining whether it is protected constitutionally. And if, as set forth above, 
the difference between the constitutionally protected behavior of perma-
nently quitting en masse and the prohibited behavior of temporarily strik-
ing is fundamentally one of expression, the distinction begins to look like 
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viewpoint-based discrimination. This is also impermissible under the 
First Amendment.91 
One might object that the difference between secondary strikes and 
secondary picketing in support of a boycott is that secondary boycotts are 
lawful, whereas secondary strikes are unlawful. Therefore, Giboney v. 
Empire Storage Company92 and its progeny93 would seem to justify out-
lawing secondary strikes as well as picketing or other activities that in-
duce or encourage the strikes.94 However, this argument is somewhat 
circular: the First Amendment does not protect this expressive conduct 
from being made unlawful because it is already unlawful. As long as the 
objective of the strike itself is lawful (for example, raising an employer’s 
labor standards or settling a primary strike) the unlawful objectives ar-
gument cannot overcome the First Amendment protections.95  
Thus, because the difference between mass quitting and striking in 
an unprotected strike96 is fundamentally expressive, the government 
should have to show that its actions in curtailing any non-expressive as-
pects of striking are necessitated by a substantial and legitimate state in-
terest. This interest cannot be related to suppression of expression, and 
                                                     
 91. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828–29 
(1995) (reciting cases establishing that viewpoint discrimination violates the First Amendment); 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (ordinance in cross-burning case stricken as facially 
unconstitutional under First Amendment because it imposes special prohibitions on speakers who 
express views on disfavored subjects, and includes viewpoint discrimination). 
 92. See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949) (“It rarely has been 
suggested that the constitutional freedom for speech and press extends its immunity to speech or 
writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.”). 
 93. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284 (1957); 
Local Union No. 10, United Ass’n of Journeymen Plumbers v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192 (1953); Bldg. 
Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 262 v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Local 
309 v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950); see also NLRB v. Wine, Liquor & Distillery Workers Union, 
Local 1, 178 F.2d 584, 587 (2d Cir. 1949) (citing Giboney to reject the First Amendment challenge 
to ban secondary strikes). 
 94. See, e.g., Local 1, 178 F.2d at 587. 
 95. See Estlund, supra note 9, at 943 (critiquing the illegal objective test, as it had developed, 
as circular). At the same time, Estlund has also observed that a picket calling on employees to strike 
might raise questions of breach of contract and hence of whether the strike might, in that way, break 
the law. Id. at n.2. As noted above, see supra note 45 and accompanying text, this Article does not 
address whether there are any constitutional limitations on the damages remedies available under 
Section 303 of the NLRA, for example, for breach of contract. However, this Article does argue that 
the remedy of injunctive relief should be no more constitutionally available against secondary strikes 
than against quitting en masse, which could also result in breach of contract but which is unques-
tionably constitutionally protected. Moreover, that either action, striking or quitting, could result in 
damages for breach of contract should not be sufficient to strip it of constitutional protection against 
injunctive relief. See infra note 97.    
 96. It is important to note the difference between a strike (or any other unprotected activity) 
and being unlawful. Lawful activity may still be unprotected. My argument is that this activity 
should not be subject to state sanction, not that employers are constitutionally prohibited from re-
sponding with self-help. I leave that argument to someone else. 
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its restrictions would have to be narrowly tailored to address those inter-
ests.97 It is difficult to see how an outright ban on expressive activity 
could satisfy that level of scrutiny. 
E. Inducing or Encouraging Secondary Strikes, the NLRA’s Gag Rule, 
and the First Amendment  
Finally, if these arguments are correct, then the gag rule imposed on 
unions under § 8(b)(4)(i)(B) looks suspect under the First Amendment as 
well. If secondary strikes enjoy a measure of constitutional protection 
against injunctions, whether under the Thirteenth or the First Amend-
ment, then the act of inducing or encouraging a strike should also enjoy 
First Amendment protection. The unlawful objectives argument, for ex-
ample, is unavailable unless the strike itself has an independently unlaw-
ful objective, such as forcing an employer to discriminate racially. Just as 
unions should be allowed to act in solidarity with one another, they 
should also be able to call on other unions or members of other unions to 
act in solidarity. 
Subjecting the ban on inducing or encouraging secondary strikes to 
stricter scrutiny is critical to the ability of unions to exercise the right to 
engage in secondary strikes argued for above. In most instances, the 
Board and the courts seek to stop unions from calling strikes. Without a 
call for a strike—whether a directive to members, a public statement, or a 
picket line—the right to engage in the strikes themselves would be a 
dead letter. The call for solidarity is critical to the exercise of the right to 
act in solidarity. Presumably, that is precisely why Congress enacted the 
sweeping language “inducing or encouraging” and why the courts have 
interpreted the ban so broadly. At a minimum, the broad standard for 
inducing or encouraging a strike that includes a “nod or a wink”98 should 
be subjected to stricter scrutiny. It is difficult to imagine such an extreme 
suppression of speech surviving that scrutiny. 
CONCLUSION 
Employment relations in our society are becoming increasingly 
fragmented. With this fragmentation, labor standards abuses are increas-
                                                     
 97. See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968) (finding that “when 
‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently im-
portant governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations 
of First Amendment freedoms,” and the governmental interest involved must be “unrelated to the 
suppression of free expression” and the “incidental restriction” on First Amendment freedom must 
be “no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest”) (emphasis added). 
 98. See supra note 57. 
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ingly pervasive.99 Unions’ ability to use secondary picketing and strikes 
to support each other and target vulnerable points in a supply, distribu-
tion, or other commercial chain is critical for rebuilding labor’s “power 
below” in order to overhaul “incentives above.” Enjoining a union or its 
members to return to work from a solidarity strike remains highly coer-
cive, even with the right to quit permanently.  The systemic coercion cre-
ated by the NLRA prohibition against secondary strikes and its enforce-
ment mechanisms is inconsistent with the states’ obligation to “maintain 
a system of completely free and voluntary labor throughout the United 
States.”100   Moreover, unprotected secondary strikes differ from consti-
tutionally protected mass quitting, largely in their expressive content. 
Distinguishing between the two, and banning the strikes, should trigger 
First Amendment scrutiny applied to content-based distinctions. For this 
reason, there should be a strong constitutional presumption against en-
joining strikes and coercing workers back to work. Furthermore, to the 
extent that strikes have the protection of the Thirteenth and First 
Amendments, the prohibitions against inducing or encouraging strikes 
also implicates the First Amendment and should be subjected to strict 
scrutiny as well. 
In short, when “they outlawed solidarity,” they broke the law.101  It 
is high time, even terribly late, that we invoke the “labor vision” of the 
Thirteenth Amendment, as well as the promise of the First Amendment, 
to protect the secondary strike and the solidarity it both realizes and ex-
presses. 
 
                                                     
 99. WEIL, supra note 31; see also ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, 
BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS 7 (2015), available at https://www.nelp.org/ 
content/uploads/2015/03/BrokenLawsReport2009.pdf?nocdn=1. 
 100. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17 (1944). 
 101. See supra article title and accompanying footnote.  
